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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

ON ARTISTIC FAMILIARITY AND AESTHETIC VALUE

IT was Mr. Perry himself who more than anyone else insisted that the validity of a "general theory of value" could be evidenced only by its fecundity in systematizing and clarifying the data of particular fields of value.[1] So any demonstration that "interest-theory" does not, in Perry's phrase, "fit the data"[2] of some area of value-experience would be, on his own showing, highly damaging. Just this has been argued, most conspicuously by Philip Blair Rice who says that ". . . an interest theory has seemed to be adequate only because so little attention has been given by general theory of value to aesthetic value."[3] This charge is renewed by Rice in the recent symposium on value-theory, where it is also voiced by Aiken and Lee,[4] all of whom, be it noted, speak with considerable authority in the field of aesthetics.

This argument is especially instructive for the study of "general theory" or axiology. For it instances the most basic and pervasive criticism which has been made of interest- and "conative-" theories generally, viz., that in taking pursuit and aspiration toward an as yet unrealized goal to be definitive of "value," they slight and fail to make provision for those experiences of rapt enjoyment and tranquil satisfaction which have at least as good a claim to be considered "value-experiences."

This is a large question, and the most promising way to approach it seems to be, as Perry suggests, by systematic consideration of relatively well-defined areas of experience which are commonly recognized to be valuable. A chief alternative, it might be gathered from a good deal of the recent literature in value-theory, is that the point should be argued by appealing at random to isolated, commonplace examples—eating apples or wooing lady fair—as though the precise nature of the structure and value of these endeavors were luminously clear to all. That it is not is obvious

[1] Perry, Ralph Barton: *General Theory of Value* (Harvard Univ. Press, 1950), pp. 11, 22 ff., 125–127.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

[3] Rice, Philip Blair: "Quality and Value," this JOURNAL, Vol. XL (1943), p. 343.

[4] Lepley, Ray, ed.: *Value: A Cooperative Inquiry* (Columbia Univ. Press, 1949), pp. 38, 271, 372. Lee here refers to the "conative" theory of Pepper.

enough from the disputations in the journals and the Lepley symposium. And there is no reason to think that this haphazard sort of argumentation, however suggestive it might be, can be conclusive until there can be presupposed far more systematic and widely authenticated knowledge of the dynamics of feeling and purpose than we have yet been able to take over from the psychologists. If, by contrast, we turn to areas of value-experience which have been systematized conceptually, such as the economic or aesthetic, we have at hand large bodies of empirical data which have been subjected to analytic refinement, by means of which we can at least get a purchase on the question of "value" and which provide a common ground for controversy. Thus, throughout the literature of art-criticism and aesthetics there are informed and sensitive descriptions of one sort of value-experience, elaborated within a system of categories designed to articulate its value-structure, which permit of analysis and appraisal by reference to the public and shareable works of art being discussed. These facts are "middle-sized," considered from both directions. They stand above the random examples cited earlier in the ways just mentioned. On the other hand, they have not (usually) been framed within a general theory of value. But it is only by recourse to such data that axiology can be developed without prejudice or circularity. And if it should prove that there are no "generic" characteristics among the aesthetic and other "species" of value, or none that are especially worth talking about, so that there is no subject-matter for "general theory of value" to be about, it would be best to find this out sooner rather than later.

The study of aesthetic experience is singularly important in this connection. It has almost always been considered the exemplar of intrinsic value. But there are other considerations. Having such experience does not preclude that others should do so. And in general the instrumental consequences of such experience are relatively slight. Therefore aesthetic enjoyment is raised above the arena of conflict and responsibility. Related to these considerations, furthermore, is the fact of cultural history, for good or ill, that the activities of aesthetic appreciation and the related, constructive activities of fine art have become increasingly inconsequential and peripheral in society. For these reasons, it is likely that the nature of intrinsic value-experience will disclose itself more readily here than in such areas as the moral, religious, and economic, where it becomes obscured by personal and institutional instrumentalities, prohibitions, and inertia.

Now it must first be said that the contention of Rice and others

cited above enjoys great *prima facie* plausibility. Mr. Rice charges that interest-theory ignores the "qualitative richness" of life. He therefore opposes to "conative" value what he calls "perceptual" value, the enjoyment taken in the apprehension of "immediate qualities."[5] He takes aesthetic experience to be the best example of this.[6] He does not deny that "conative factors" are present in such experience, but he holds that they are of "secondary importance."[7]

That the etymology of the term "aesthetic" is on Mr. Rice's side counts, perhaps, for little. More important is the recurrence in critical and aesthetic thought of the view that the essence of aesthetic experience consists in relishing the look and feel of the world and resting content in its contemplation. Such aesthetic absorption has been thought to put to rest any purposive striving for that which is not yet had. This is found in philosophers as disparate as Plato, Aquinas, and Schopenhauer. It is celebrated vividly in the aestheticism of Walter Pater and taken for granted by the poet in his banal description of the appreciation of Nature as "standing and staring."

Those who have brought interest-theory under attack in this way might have remarked, further, that there is aid and comfort to be found in the camp of the enemy. In one of the few places in *General Theory of Value* in which he speaks explicitly of aesthetic value, Mr. Perry seems to tip his hand by abjuring it as central to value-theory and by speaking up instead on behalf of the "values" of "effort, struggle, aspiration."[8] It might also be noted that this work is in very great measure given over to the values of moral choice and social organization, in which thought must necessarily be taken for the morrow. It is in notable contrast, in this respect, with other book-length studies of value, such as those of Prall and J. R. Reid, who do not espouse thoroughgoing conative theories. Less presumptive evidence is to be found in Mr. Perry's recent "sequel," *Realms of Value,*[9] which announces no significant modification in, let alone departure from, the interest-theory. Of the many comments which are made in the chapter devoted to aesthetic experience, wise and just though they are for the most part, very few evidence any particular explanatory power of the interest-theory, for they might equally

[5] "Quality and Value," *loc. cit.*, pp. 339–342.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 342.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 343.
[8] *Op. cit.*, pp. 33–34; *cf.*, also, pp. 181–182, 554.
[9] Perry, Ralph Barton: *Realms of Value* (Harvard Univ. Press, 1954).

well be made in the framework of some different or opposed axiology, or indeed without regard to any "general theory" at all.

All this betokens perhaps a bed-rock temperamental difference in the approach to value by Perry and his opponents. Perhaps it makes us more sceptical of the possibility of any "general theory of value." In any event we can agree that "perceptual value" is present, frequently at least, in aesthetic experience. And yet I do not think that the issue has to be decided wholly against interest-theory.

Mr. Rice complains, quite justly, that axiology has not paid sufficient attention to aesthetic value, specifically. Yet both Mr. Rice and his opponents, in discussing the "value" of "aesthetic experience," have paid little or no attention to a significant respect in which the instances of such experience differ among themselves. This has led them to speak of aesthetic experiences as though they were all on the same footing in this regard. I wish to call attention to the differences among aesthetic experiences in respect of the spectator's *familiarity* with the work of art,[10] i.e., whether and to what extent the work has been an object of aesthetic perception for him in the past. I shall wish to show that this factor is "significant" in the structure of aesthetic experience because upon it depends largely, though not exclusively, the kind of value present in the experience. More specifically, I wish to show that to take account of the differences among aesthetic experiences which are due to familiarity, the categories of interest-theory are just indispensable and must be employed together with "perceptual value" if the analysis of aesthetic value is to be at all adequate. But it is not merely that aesthetic experiences are *different* because of familiarity. Familiarity is usually taken as a necessary condition of authoritative evaluation and criticism. To help understand the reasons for this, interest-theory will be found to be uniquely well-adapted and fruitful. On the basis of this discussion, the use of familiarity as a criterion of comparative aesthetic value will be analyzed.

I

The interest-theory singles out two elements which it takes to be distinctive of value-experience: forward-looking concern for the attainment of some object or state of affairs which is not yet present, and cognitive anticipation of what is to be experienced in the future. These are of central and definitory importance in interest-

[10] The analysis should be valid for non-artistic, natural objects as well, but these are not generally "framed" and stable as are works of art.

theory. The former is implicit in the notion of "governing propensity" and the latter, "the cognitive component in interest," [11] Perry calls "expectation." Mr. Rice is concerned with "immediate qualities" and if we apply the notion of interest to the aesthetic perception of those objects which might be thought to exhibit "quality" most obviously—elementary tones, colors, textures—we come to understand and share in his dissatisfaction with interest-theory somewhat more. For here attention seems to be absorbed in what is currently given, without any anticipatory concern.[12] Perry would say that the spectator is interested in prolonging the experience, but the truth seems to be with Rice, who argues that it distorts the situation to take this to be the element of value, for "we hold on to [the object] because the perception is experienced as intrinsically valuable." [13]

But let us turn to works of art, which are objects of far greater complexity and internal differentiation, and consider the question, How do we respond to works of art of which we have had no previous experience? Let us disregard such cases as hearing a Scarlatti sonata for the first time, after one is already familiar with many other of these small pieces, or the apprehension of a work which is highly stylized or academic by one familiar with the period. It will make the question more pointed if we recall the reception accorded the music of Stravinsky or Richard Strauss or the paintings of the *fauves* early in this century. For the most part, our response is one of mild bewilderment mingled with apathy. We say colloquially that we "don't understand" the work or that we "don't see what it is saying"; therefore it "leaves us cold." This does not preclude taking delight in some partial component of the work. It is in the apprehension of the work's sensuous detail—some color or line or timbre—that there will, in all likelihood, be found whatever value the experience possesses. For such elements can be apprehended in relative isolation, by contrast to a large-scale form or thematic significance which runs throughout the work and eludes the spectator's grasp or comprehension. But even such relatively slight "perceptual" value may not be enjoyed on the first encounter with an art-object. This is because, first, the work's sensory presentation is frequently so intimately related to its form and "meaning," which are in the present instance opaque to the spectator, and, second, as we are prone to forget when we fall into the uncritical assumption found in much aesthetics—that all works of art are uniformly excellent exemplifica-

[11] *General Theory of Value*, p. 313.
[12] *Cf.* "Quality and Value," p. 344.
[13] *Loc. cit.*, p. 345; *cf.*, also, Rice in *Value*, p. 270.

tions of the matter-form-expression scheme,—the sensuous attractiveness of many works is quite inconsequential. Even where there are moments of "perceptual" value, a spectator of any critical discernment will not confuse his experience with an adequate appreciation of the work. Thus a music critic will often plead that he cannot pass judgment on a first hearing. Thus Richards, in setting up his experiments in "practical criticism," decided that a number of "perusals" might have to be counted together to constitute one "reading" of a poem.[14]

Greater familiarity with the work, abetted by critical analysis and interpretation, influences the spectator's experience in two ways chiefly. Primarily, he develops a sense of the distinctive character and import of the work, which sets it off from other works, and thereby of the peculiar value which it might have for contemplation. He comes to see what the "effect" of the work is intended to be.[15] In the case of radically novel works, like those cited above, this will come only with great difficulty; at other times it is made easier by familiarity with other works by the same artist or in the same period or *genre*. In either event, the percipient arrives at a conception of the response which would be appropriate to the work and which would be comprehensive, rather than fragmentary, because it embraces all that there is of value in the work. This may be called the "just" or "fitting" response. Integral to this conception is a sense of the "tone" or "spirit" in which the work is written and of its "scale." Whether it be flippant or earnest, pretentious or modest, "big" or "little" must be known or at least decided upon, if the work is to be viewed more profitably than at first. That we can go grievously astray in this respect is attested many times over in the history of "modern" art, as when works which were essentially *jeux d'esprit* were apprehended humorlessly, or *vice versa*, when dead-serious works were thought to be jokes or exercises. What the spectator takes to be the fitting response may, of course, be found to be distorted or inadequate, with greater familiarity. Yet some such conception is essential to perception, as will be shown later. It must also be pointed out that one can have a sense of what the fitting response would be without actually achieving that response in felt

[14] Richards, I. A.: *Practical Criticism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1952), p. 4.

[15] It should not have to be noted that this makes no reference to the "intention" of the artist, whatever it may be, and if anyone can know it. Mr. Rice's view that aesthetic perception is "conative" in attempting to "grasp the artist's purpose" ("Quality and Value," p. 343) vitiates part of his argument.

experience. It is only by means of this sense that the fitting response may be achieved, but the response may always remain an ideal. Thus we leave room for the percipient who "sees" what the effect of the work is supposed to be, and yet, for reasons which he can sometimes articulate himself, is unable to realize it in his own experience, a notable instance being the musical conductor who protests at the end of his career that he has never been able to achieve in performance the effect which he thinks does justice to the work.

The second important gain in greater familiarity with a work of art is the development of informed sensitivity to its form or structure, i.e, the way in which its components are organized and interrelated with each other. Form is here singled out because it is this "dimension" of the art-object whose demands upon the beholder are least likely to be met upon initial encounter. This is a chief source of his bewilderment and of the damage to the aesthetic experience. It is as much true of the "spatial" arts, so-called, as of the temporal, that formal organization runs through time, in the case of a complex painting or a cathedral, over an extended period of time.[16] In an unfamiliar work it outruns what the percipient can hold together and attend to. Hence he will tend to fasten upon segments of the work which can be discriminated in the "span of attention," notably the sensory details referred to earlier. Return to the work develops acquaintance with the sequence or order in which the parts of the work present themselves, the recurrences of details, and the ways in which the same details are altered and inflected in the course of the work. However, this awareness of form presupposes and is ancillary to the sense of the work's intended effect. The way in which the work is structured in apprehension by the spectator must be guided by realization of the way in which its organization contributes to the value of felt experience. Otherwise we fall prey to the dangers that the form of the work will be misconstrued, or that the significances of repetition and inflection within it will be lost, or that the knowledge of form will be mere schematization, abstracted from and external to the work, as in the proverbial analyses of sonnet and sonata form in badly-taught classes in "art-appreciation." Conversely, of course, greater familiarity with the form may lead us to alter our conception of the fitting response. Thus, what occurs at best in coming to know a work of art is that the sense of its total effect and discrimination of its form develop *pari passu,*

[16] *Cf.* Souriau, Etienne: "Time in the Plastic Arts," *Journal of Aesthetics,* Vol. VII, No. 4 (June, 1949), pp. 294–307.

the former providing justification and direction for the latter, the latter giving specificity and vividness to the former.

This brief natural history of the process of artistic familiarization can, happily, be supplemented by the detailed description of this process in a novelist who speaks with the authority of the incredible aesthetic sensibility manifest throughout his work. This is Proust's account of Swann's experience of "the little phrase" of music which figures so prominently in the opening sections of *Remembrance of Things Past.*

At the beginning of the initial encounter with the sonata, Proust tells us, it is the sensory "quality" alone which is found valuable: "At first he had appreciated only the material quality of the sounds which those instruments [piano and violin] secreted." Then, abruptly and unexpectedly, the "little phrase," which he comes so much to cherish, bursts in upon Swann for the first time: ". . . at a given moment, without being able to distinguish any clear outline . . . suddenly enraptured, he had tried to collect, to treasure in his memory the phrase or harmony—he knew not which—that had just been played, and had opened and expanded his soul."[17] But though the phrase is "rapturously" delightful and arresting, there is something wanting, which diminishes its charm. Proust describes the initial perception as a "confused impression" and goes on to explain:

> But the notes themselves have vanished before [our] sensations have developed sufficiently to escape submersion under those which the following, or even simultaneous notes have already begun to awaken in us. And this indefinite perception would continue to smother in its molten liquidity the *motifs* which now and then emerge, barely discernible, to plunge again and disappear and drown . . . if our memory . . . did not, by fashioning for us facsimiles of those fugitive phrases, enable us to compare and contrast them with those that follow. And so, hardly had the delicious sensation, which Swann had experienced, died away, before his memory had furnished him with an immediate transcript, summary, it is true, and provisional, but one on which he had kept his eyes fixed while the playing continued, so effectively that, when the same impression suddenly returned, it was no longer uncapturable. He was able to picture to himself its extent, its symmetrical arrangement, its notation, the strength of its expression; he had before him that definite object which was no longer pure music, but rather design, architecture, thought, and which allowed the actual music to be recalled. This time he had distinguished, quite clearly, a phrase which had emerged for a few moments from the waves of sound . . . and he had been filled with love for it.[18]

Summing up our account of familiarization, we can say first that familiarity develops in the spectator anticipatory "sets" or

[17] Proust, Marcel: *Remembrance of Things Past*, tr. by Moncrieff (New York: Random House, 1934), Vol. I, p. 159.

[18] *Op. cit.*, p. 160.

attitudes which control his apprehension of the art-object. His sense of the work's intended effect and of its "tone" and dimension is tantamount to knowing what to expect from it. At the initial encounter, even with the most benevolent desire to do justice to the work, expectation must necessarily lack direction and specificity. Now sympathetic concern can be pointed effectively toward relishing the work's distinctive value. This involves vigilant and selective awareness of the work, which replaces the diffuseness of the original perception with emphasis and discrimination. Furthermore, expectation predisposes the spectator to the kind of receptivity required for the adequate response. By the same token, he will inhibit the perceptual attitudes and responses which have been found to be irrelevant or distracting in the light of the intended effect. Familiarity with form enables the spectator to exercise the faculties of memory and anticipation which were originally idle or unenlightened. His expectation of recurrences and modulations within the work make it possible to relate what was originally a stringy succession of confrontations in terms of their contribution to the total effect. Santayana's dictum has it that "Familiarity breeds contempt only when it breeds inattention,"[19] and we may interpret this for our purposes to mean that familiarity focuses and intensifies attention in the ways described, whereas attention, when the work is still unfamiliar, is blind and scattered and therefore fairly scant.

By tracing out the difference which perceptual "sets" make to aesthetic experience, we can close in on the issues in value-theory which underlie this paper. Informed expectations of the structure and intended effect of the work are indispensable if the spectator is to have an acute feeling of the tensions and drives which animate the work as it unfolds. Apprehension of an area or section of the work in its relation to the "beginning, middle, and end," in the discriminating manner just discussed, invests it with a new significance. This is apprehension marked with urgency and vividness. For now what is presented to the percipient is caught up in the movement of the work and its perception is edged with the desire for the resolution or fulfillment to which it points. A syncopation or modulation, once the basic rhythm and theme are familiar, adds zest in itself, and also enhances forward-looking interest in return to the theme when, as Tovey says, it comes "sailing home in the tonic," or to the predominant beat. The significance of a thrust or mass in architecture is dependent on its contribution to the over-all movement and design, once this is

[19] Santayana, George: *The Sense of Beauty* (New York: Scribner, 1936), p. 126.

known to the beholder. The initial hostility between Elizabeth Bennet and Mr. Darcy in *Pride and Prejudice* becomes psychologically comprehensible only in the light of the retrospective significance of the later episodes in the book, which delineate their characters further; after they have been found to be not simply myopic or odious, there is affectionate concern for their ultimate bliss. Without the amplitude and vigor which it gains from such conative drives, aesthetic experience cannot be said to be fully realized.

Familiarity, then, does not stultify art or deaden its appeal. It gives direction and significance to perception, without which the value of the art-object could never be truly known. Art can be pristine for us only if we are no longer innocent.

The categories of interest-theory are vital to aesthetic analysis not only in their mutual relation, but also because of the *distinction* between them drawn by Perry. Aesthetic experience informed by familiarity has thus far been discussed as though the work and the percipient were such that there is continued desire in attending sympathetically to the work. But expectation is not always accompanied by interest: "an expected event may be hoped for, or dreaded, or viewed with indifference."[20] This distinction is necessary if we are to mark off experience which is veritably aesthetic from that which is not. One may possess utter familiarity with a work, in the sense that he knows every detail of the score or every episode in the play, so that he can reliably predict what will occur as the work develops. This may, however, exist without the desire that the expected sequel *should* occur, except for the satisfaction of curiosity. And where such satisfaction is had, it is unrelated to the artistic goodness or badness of the work. For it might just as well be felt where the work was, in fact, lacking in aesthetic consummation and unity.

"Conative" value becomes increasingly important in aesthetic experience, we find, as the spectator develops familiarity with the art-object. How does this affect the "perceptual" or sensuous value of the experience? Any simple answer to this question would be fatuous and misleading. We can say that in many instances of aesthetic experience concern with the sensory aspects of the work, which is characteristic of the initial encounter, decreases. Instead of dwelling upon these, the percipient becomes more concerned with how they are employed and modulated in the course of the work. A more interesting and subtle change, and one which is, for the percipient, literally more "valuable," is exemplified

[20] Perry: *Realms of Value*, p. 41.

by Swann's experience of "the little phrase." We found there first, that there was initial interest only in sensory quality, and second, that this was succeeded by preoccupation with "design, architecture." Then we learn that this familiarity with form enhances and vivifies the enjoyment of quality; sensations which are at first "confused" and "undeveloped" become acute and overpoweringly delightful only when such familiarity is gained. Though Swann's experience is revealing in this way, it is, of course, an odd one, because he is peculiarly concerned not with the sonata as a whole, but with the "delicious sensation" of "the little phrase." Under more usual circumstances, familiarity with the work's intended effect and total structure can convert sensory presentations which may at first seem not only "confused" but even dull and tawdry, into highly individualized objects of perceptual charm and piquancy, when the spectator comes to see them against the background on which they are displayed.

All these possibilities considered, it is difficult to agree with Mr. Rice's categorical assertion that "conative factors" in aesthetic experience are always of "secondary importance."[21] It becomes even more difficult when we consider some of the other ways in which works of art are valuable. Primarily there are works of art in which what Mr. Rice calls the "splendor of the sensuous manifold"[22] is very dim indeed, as when a prose style is stilted and pedestrian. *Pride and Prejudice* combines a buoyant, lucid, and witty style with brisk movement of plot, but this is a matchless novel. In inferior works the "perceptual" value may well be slight and it is in forward-looking interest that we must locate most of the value of the experience. Mr. Rice wishes to call *all* intrinsic value "enjoyment" or "liking," whether it be "perceptual" or "conative."[23] But then there are two alternatives. Either these words are merely synonyms for "value," in which case they do not get us forwarder in analysis of the structure of value-experience. To analyze aesthetic experience of the sort of

[21] *Loc. cit.* It should be pointed out that Mr. Rice bases this criticism partly on an interpretation of interest-theory according to which purposive activity is always pursuit of a goal for which the agent must devise means; against this he argues that in aesthetic perception we are "following and not leading" (p. 343). There are passages in Perry which lend credence to this interpretation, as when he says that interest entails the disposition "to bring its object into being" (*General Theory of Value*, p. 318). But this interpretation is not demanded by the theory (*cf., op. cit.*, p. 353) though such passages probably reflect the "practical" bias of their author (*cf.*, above, pp. 263, 264–265.

[22] *Loc. cit.*, p. 344.

[23] *Ibid.*

art currently in question, interest-theory is of primary significance no matter what words we choose to substitute for "value." Or else Mr. Rice means by "conative enjoyment" what he calls the "release of tensions."[24] But this begs the question against interest-theory, for it is not the *satisfaction* of interest which this theory takes to be definitive of value.[25] To do justice to the aesthetic experience, we must distinguish between the prolongation of desire and its fulfillment and the value of each. The problem becomes aggravated when we consider works of art which are ugly or of "difficult beauty." Mr. Rice's word "quality," by reference to which he defines "perceptual value," is, as he knows, a difficult one, in aesthetics as in other fields of philosophy. It is not clear whether the apprehension of quality is taken to be accompanied invariably by pleasantness, but use of the term "enjoyment" to describe the perception of quality suggests this. In such art as tragedy, there is certainly a vivification of quality achieved through the backward- and forward-looking perception referred to earlier. However, aesthetic response is here marked by negative hedonic tone, so that on this score too there is doubt that "perceptual value" can do the job of explaining the value-experience. Here again we must draw on the categories of interest-theory.

In general, then, interest and the mediating expectation which it includes become increasingly important to the value of aesthetic experience as the spectator develops familiarity with the work of art. Hence we can neglect interest-theory in aesthetics only at our own loss. This is particularly true since familiarity with art is generally considered indispensable to well-founded evaluation and criticism. How this belief can be justified, in terms of the development of expectations and conative drives, has already been shown. On the other hand, there is no need nor is there any intention here of denying the quasi-eulogistic name "aesthetic" to the sort of experience which occurs during initial commerce with the art-object, when "perceptual value" is more nearly conspicuous. Room must be made for both kinds of value. The charge that conative theory ignores the delight or satisfaction of immediate experience should be considered only in conjunction with the correlative criticism of non-conative theories, viz., that they slight what Parker calls the "go," the anticipatory impulse or movement which we have found to be integral to informed aesthetic experience. In the case of some anti-conative theories, this has been due partly to their polemical concern to urge, against

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 340.

[25] *Cf., e.g., Realms of Value*, p. 41.

Perry's definition, that "value," equated with "satisfaction" or some such term, can exist apart from antecedent desire. But also, some of them give the appearance of trading on a conception of the paradigmatic aesthetic experience which is not less untrue because it is eminently traditional—that its object is a delightful sensory presentation, and that its contemplation is so rapturous that the beholder is freed from all demands and expectations.

II

The notion of familiarity occurs most frequently in aesthetic discourse as a criterion of evaluation, particularly comparative evaluation. The most prominent instance is the characterization, sometimes employed as a definition, of "great" art as art to which we can return indefinitely and find valuable, art which custom never stales, art which is always rewarding. The hyperbole, characteristic of the way in which men describe the things they love most, conceals an important ambiguity in this kind of talk. On the one hand, it may be meant that when, with familiarity, the spectator has developed a fairly determinate conception of the work's intended effect and is able to structure it formally in apprehending it, then the realization in his experience of what he takes to be the fitting response is found valuable, on each occasion of experiencing the work. On the other hand, it may be meant that even after such a response is had, the spectator can develop quite another conception of the work's intended effect, even a great number of them, so that value-experiences of different kinds can be had in transaction with the work. It becomes all the more important to distinguish these two senses of "greatness" when we remark the relations between them: it is logically possible that the former should exist without the latter, and all of us can adduce examples from our own experience to show that this does occur in fact; neither does the latter presuppose the former, though both *may* occur in response to some works of art, notably those which are supremely great.

We will be able to draw these distinctions more readily if a few terms are introduced at this point. Taking a term which has been used often enough in contemporary criticism, let us mean by a "level" of aesthetic experience a specific and coherent conception of the intended effect of the work of art. On this level there will occur many particular experiences more or less approximating what the beholder takes to be the fitting response. We can then speak of a "range" of experiences at this level. With familiarization, as this was described earlier, the spectator moves toward

that point within the range which marks the fitting or optimum response. This is the response which realizes in felt experience the value of the work. It is the response of the spectator who has overcome the "dead spots," the opacities, the intractable complexities of form which marred the initial encounters with the work. In this response, the spectator is sensitive to the significance of the components of the work for the total effect and is able to follow effortlessly its unfolding in time, feeling the expectancies and resolutions implicit in its development.

Now the first of the criteria of "greatness" distinguished above refers to this kind of response. It is the criterion that after the optimum or fitting response has been achieved, the work of art is able to arouse it, upon repeated encounters, with no diminution of value. This spells out what we mean by the "freshness" or "vitality" of some works of art. It is doubtful that this can serve as a definition of "greatness," for then we would have to use that term more promiscuously than we would wish, to include works which are "charming" or "exquisite" rather than "great." But it is useful if taken as a necessary condition of greatness, for it excludes those works which become "used up," once their value is exploited in a single encounter. To deny "greatness" to such works has no implications concerning the intensity or quality of the value of the optimum response when it is had. Nor does it show that the value of that experience was, in any sense, specious or ill-founded. It signifies, rather, that we have no further interest in returning to the work, or that if we do, the work proves stale and lifeless. Of many such works it might be said that their "perceptual" value is slight and that all hinges on the prolongation of interest which eventuates in an unexpected or "trick" climax. Many short stories and detective mysteries and a great deal of that kind of humor which depends for its effect upon the sudden, explosive "punch-line" would be elementary examples of this.

Examples of works which wear well will be found wherever a concert audience responds with an appreciative sigh, such as all of us have heard, when one of the perennially "familiar" and "best-loved" compositions is announced. (The way in which those two terms are coupled and sometimes seem even to be used interchangeably is interesting.) We may conjecture that the reasons for this reaction are probably not always veritably aesthetic. It may be due to recollection of experiences associated with previous hearings of the number. Or it may express the listener's awareness that now no onerous demands will be made upon the faculties of alertness and attention. But our cynicism should not blind us

to the real value of those works which can stand the test of familiarity.

The second criterion of "greatness," which seems to be more commonly intended in critical and aesthetic writings, is quite different. It is what we have in mind when we say of works of art that we are "always seeing something new in them" or that they are—Professor Greene's word—"inexhaustible." This is apt to be confused with the aspect of greatness just discussed, for it may refer to the process of discerning more detail, apprehending new structural relationships, and so on, whereby the beholder's experience moves through the range of a certain level toward the optimum response. However, this second criterion refers, properly, not to any single level but to the multiplicity of levels on which a work of art can be appreciated. This has become common enough coin in recent criticism, where the detection of a number of different levels seems frequently to be considered tantamount to the ascription of great value to the work. It must be noted, however, that this too is not in itself adequate as a sufficient condition of artistic greatness. That there may be a number of levels appropriate to a certain work tells us nothing of the value of even the optimum response on those levels. If it were true that, as has sometimes been suggested, all works of art can be "read" on a number of different levels, then to take this to be definitive of "greatness" would destroy the significance and usefulness of the category. It is worth repeating, furthermore, that whether a number of levels exists has no logical bearing on whether the work permits of repeated encounters at any single level, as in the aspect of greatness discussed previously.

Artistic familiarity is essential to the statement of the first criterion of greatness. It has no similarly simple relation to the second. There are three possibilities here depending on the different relations which may hold between the levels of appreciation, differences which are not always noted in the current talk about levels. Primarily, the levels may be just unrelated, in the sense that the "sets" and expectations developed through familiarity with the work on one level neither facilitate nor hinder the response at another level. This probably occurs only rarely, for there is generally some carry-over from one interpretation to the other, and may be considered as a limiting case. Yet a work of art often wears so many different faces and can be "read" so variously that this possibility should not be ignored. It becomes actual when we say of a work that now we "see it in a new light" and are startled upon recalling that our present experience bears little or no resemblance to the earlier. It occurs when the levels

of interpretation are concerned with utterly different aspects of the work, a situation approximated by the contrast between one who focuses on the representational element in a painting and Roger Fry, who records that, after many hours of looking at pictures in his own fashion, he is unable to remember their subject-matter. Artistic familiarity is of significance here only in working toward the optimum response on any one level, not in the relations between different levels. It is more significant, but in quite an odd way, in the second case. Here the levels are concerned with at least some of the same dimensions of the work, but they are interpreted in antithetical ways, so that the expectations and attitudes proper to one response are inimical to and exclusive of those of another level. Consider, for example, the pronounced jar we experience upon hearing a composition, to which we are accustomed in the Bruno Walter reading, interpreted by Toscanini. The difference in tempo alone, to name just one, though a not inconsiderable, feature, is frequently enough to throw us off so that we are unable to attend sympathetically throughout the performance. Again, to interpret Kafka's novels as a satire on bureaucracy, or as an essentially "healthy" celebration of personal fortitude, or as a dramatization of neo-orthodox theology, requires, on each level, wholly different and psychologically incompatible organization of the faculties of attention and response. In this instance, to move from one level to another demands familiarization which, paradoxically, must overcome and eradicate the earlier familiarity.

The third kind of relation between levels is probably what is usually intended in speaking of "greatness." Now the perceptual "sets" of one level can be preserved while being incorporated into an augmented experience at a "deeper" level. In this relation, by contrast to the two foregoing, familiarity at one level abets and contributes toward the value-experience which is had at another level.

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COMMENTS AND CRITICISM

IN THE NAME OF HUMAN FINITUDE: AN EXAMINATION OF REINHOLD NIEBUHR'S *CHRISTIAN REALISM AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS*

BY common consent, existent things are said to come into being and to pass out of being. They are named for the relatively persistent structures they exhibit. And their capacity to take on such forms and to lose them as well is at least part of what is

intended by expressions of the sort, "Existent things have an historical nature." Such expressions, moreover, are fairly regarded as empirically grounded.

The nature of existent things, then, includes an individual, unformed power to take on forms and the forms themselves which groups of existent things will exhibit in common. Unfortunately, the term *nature* is also applied in a useful way to refer, in tentative contrast with the term *history*, to certain particularly persistent physical structures which existent things may possess; and *history* is sometimes reserved for the study of the events of human societies. Unless we acknowledge the limited function of the terms in this context, we are bound to be deceived by such expressions as *natural* and *historical sciences, Naturwissenschaft* and *Geisteswissenschaft*.

One may easily be tempted to conclude from such usage that there are to be considered under those names two quite separate domains: one a domain of nature, the other not properly a part of nature; one a domain of history, the other not properly a part of history. And this conviction, not content with the different technical difficulties regularly confronted in the natural and historical sciences, frequently finds expression in the view that there are radical methodological differences between these two orders—that, for example, the most general scientific procedures applied in the one cannot be applied in the other, that the confidence which the claims to knowledge that the natural sciences inspire is not *in principle* appropriate to the historical sciences.

The issue is, of course, regularly debated in terms of such general concepts as natural and social causation, the relation of fact to value, the status of unique events, the relation of the mind to the body, freedom and determinism. Without prejudicing the solution of these problems, it would seem reasonable to explore the fundamental metaphysical issues which are here entailed for some clue to the probable continuity or discontinuity between the natural and the historical sciences. In fact it is difficult to see how the alleged methodological gap could be fully and persuasively described without evidence of some metaphysical discontinuity between the domains to which these sciences refer.

If we accept the wider conceptions of nature and of history already outlined, it is not at all obvious that the so-called natural and historical sciences are radically different. Physical phenomena are also historical events and social events do exhibit an intelligible structure. Emergent types of beings are not unknown in biology and, certainly, at least part of the causal structure of the business cycle is understood in economics. One might be inclined

to say that human history changes much more rapidly than does the structure of the events with which the physical sciences are concerned. But even if it were so, it would not argue more than the greater professional difficulties of the historical sciences. Both domains are concerned with sets of events whose respective items are equally "unique" in the sense that they cannot be historically repeated, though substitutes having very similar structures may perhaps be found more readily in the natural than in the social sciences. Both domains are equally "bound" in an historical sense, since new events may occur in either whose structures differ significantly from all those that have been previously studied and upon which law-like generalizations have already been based. In a word, both domains, like all the fields of human activity, are *inherently incapable of discovering in a finite period of time the intelligible structure of events which unfolds in infinite historical processes.*

If one preferred religious language, this could be expressed by saying that man in his sinful and prideful nature acts as if to overcome the conditions of his existence: man should not seek to play at God; in more secular terms, human knowledge is probable knowledge and all systems of knowledge and action are open systems. Still, it is important to note that we are dealing with actual human knowledge in both domains; the specific concern with the margin of error within which human scientists operate is not merely evidence of the charm of a chaste science, it is an essential part of science itself.

To pursue this distinction for a moment in what might at first appear to be its minor theme—the religiously oriented critic of human history may, in his zeal, protest somewhat too strenuously the folly of human pride. If he formulated this protest in the most radical terms, he might ultimately be committed to a doctrine resembling that of total depravity. But even if he explicitly opposed such an extreme view of human nature, his zeal might, by its own defect, make it quite difficult to identify the distinction of his outlook.

The relevance of this "aside" may be judged through illustration. Let us consider, for instance, the recently expressed view of Reinhold Niebuhr, who genuinely seeks to support a moderate, though unabashedly Christian, conception of the sinfulness of man:

> It is true that the human situation is such that repentance is always required even as evil always flourishes. But it is wrong to preach this Gospel *sub specie aeternitatis* as if there were no history with its time and seasons, and with its particular occasions. Nor is our preaching of any avail if we only

persuade men and nations to acknowledge the original sin which infects us all but not the particular sins of which we are guilty.[1]

There is the promise of a new life for men and nations in the Gospel; but there is no guarantee of historic success. There is no way of transmuting the Christian Gospel into a system of historical optimism. The final victory over man's disorder is God's and not ours; but we do have responsibility for proximate victories. Christian life without a high sense of responsibility for the health of our communities, our nations and our cultures degenerates into an intolerable other-worldliness. We can neither renounce this earthly home of ours nor yet claim that its victories and defeats give the final meaning to our existence.[2]

Niebuhr's own role as a Christian witness has been at least partially occupied with detailing the specific historical encounters in which the finitude and sinfulness of human nature have been dangerously ignored. He points to those enterprises which "have been fruitful of many errors and illusions on the ultimate level"[3]: "the idea of a presuppositionless science of human affairs,"[4] "the idea of the perfectibility of man" and "the idea of progress,"[5] "the fallacy of world government,"[6] "utopianism [as] the basis of the evil in communism."[7] In each instance Niebuhr is concerned to relate the negative theme of the Christian Gospel, which is *ultimately* true of every possible human endeavor, which is true *sub specie aeternitatis,* to specific *historical* situations that hold the attention of contemporary men. His message includes the theme of a constructive conservatism, the cultivation of the "instinct for the possible, only a little advanced beyond the actual, instead of the utopian and ideal which hovers so precariously between the possible and the impossible. . . ."[8]

It is a service not to be despised, for it seeks to groom a habit of mind alert once and for all to the unstable and imperfect nature of all programs of social reform, without dismissing the possibility of actual reform; it encourages a " 'humility before the fact,' " a "Christian 'realism.' "[9] One may find it difficult to see why this good advice should be regarded as distinctively Christian or even religious; let us concede the point. But what can possibly be

[1] Reinhold Niebuhr, *Christian Realism and Political Problems* (New York, 1953), p. 112.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 115–116.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 17.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 37.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 66.
[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 4–8.

the status, in terms of this Christian realism, of actual reforms no matter how tentative?

What can possibly be the meaning of such statements as these:

. . . be grateful for a democratic society which manages to extract a *measure* of truth from the contest of contrasting errors.

It provides for checks and balances upon the pretensions of men as well as well as upon their lust for power; it thereby prevents truth from turning into falsehood when the *modicum* of error is not challenged and the *modicum* of truth in a falsehood is not rescued and cherished.[10]

The new life which we require collectively in our age is a community wide enough to make the world-wide interdependence of nations in a technical age sufferable; and a justice *carefully enough* balanced to make the dynamic forces of a technical society yield a *tolerable* justice rather than an alternation of intolerable anarchy and intolerable tyranny.[11]

These surely argue that man may comprehend something of the fundamental structure of human history and act with some measure of assurance to stabilize political reforms which he may somewhat justify. Presumably, these express a confidence in the constructive powers of a finite humanity. Still, the tempting image of a deeper sinfulness, of a total human incapacity (to which Niebuhr seems to be attracted as to a mathematical limit), constantly rears its head:

But if it should be true that even the most righteous life remains in *some degree* of contradiction to the divine, it is hazardous either for individual Christians or the Church to point to their goodness as proofs of the truth of their faith. The final answer to this *incoherence* between the human and the divine will is the divine suffering mercy; and for this no reason can be given.[12]

The argument insists that there is an *ultimate* and incorrigible finitude in every human endeavor; yet Niebuhr speaks as if one could distinguish between the human and the divine as a matter of *degree*. The same ambiguity appears in an earlier passage:

It is in searching for the ultimate meaning of the morally intolerable suffering of righteous and *comparatively* innocent Israel that Chapter 53 of Isaiah first establishes the relation between a *moral obscurity in history* with what becomes in the New Testament the *final* clarification of the moral obscurity of history, a suffering God.[13]

The issue is reminiscent of the theological dispute over the relation of human will and divine grace, on which there is perhaps no more revealing statement than that of St. Ignatius Loyola:

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 14. Italics mine.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 114. Italics mine.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 202. Italics mine.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 186. Italics mine.

It must also be borne in mind, that although it be most true, that no one is saved but he that is predestinated, yet we must speak with circumspection concerning this matter, lest perchance, stressing too much the grace or predestination of God, we should seem to wish to shut out the force of free will and the merits of good works; or on the other hand, attributing to these latter more than belongs to them, we derogate meanwhile from the power of grace. For the like reason we should not speak on the subject of predestination frequently. . . .[14]

From a religious point of view, the finitude of man, whether in scientific endeavor or in moral endeavor, is incorrigible. Niebuhr is perhaps right in his criticism of the confident Thomist "two-story world with a classical base and a Christian second story."[15] But the finite efforts of man do reveal a relatively stable structure in the world which can be refined within the limits of his finitude. Niebuhr oscillates between the religious theme of the infinite which ultimately reveals every human effort as inadequate, transient, distorting, vain and a theme (possibly compatible with a religious and even Christian concern but not derivable from it) of modest assurance in the possible enlargement of human knowledge, in the improvements of human affairs. In one theme Niebuhr considers the *overcoming of the problem of finitude;* in the other, *improvements within the realm of finitude.* In the one, the *mystery* and necessity of grace; in the other, the *rationality* and contingency of human science and art.

Let us juxtapose for a moment two brief statements which exhibit this tension in Niebuhr's thought most clearly:

The final irrationality of the givenness of things is frankly accepted.[16]

We cannot afford to obscure the rational coherences in man's social life, however imperfect.[17]

To employ the habit of paradox of which Niebuhr himself is fond, we may say that, although it is the most comprehensive and essential insight which man can possibly share, the discovery of his ultimate finitude is the most sublimely irrelevant comment which man can possibly offer. It is a religious concern to reconcile man to the conditions of his existence; and in this sense, all of his scientific and active commitments are religiously significant. But as far as positive science and action are themselves at stake, it is beside the point to harp constantly on the fact of their essential

[14] St. Ignatius Loyola, *Spiritual Exercises,* excerpted and quoted by Henry Bettenson, *Documents of the Christian Church* (New York and London, 1947), p. 365.

[15] Niebuhr, *op. cit.,* p. 189.

[16] *Ibid.,* p. 181.

[17] *Ibid.,* p. 195.

incompleteness. Rational human activity seeks to comprehend whatever order it may comprehend; the admission of the ultimate incoherence and irrationality of such endeavor contributes nothing to the internal discipline of that endeavor. And therefore it is unwise to intrude constantly the wise knowledge of the sinfulness, the vanity, the folly of human effort; for religion can be *certain* only on this score, it is as *historically uncertain* as any other source of insight on the solution of problems within the historical order. Nor is Niebuhr unwilling to acknowledge this truth.[18]

The upshot of the analysis thus far is to dramatize the apparent, fundamental similarity of the natural and the historical sciences to which we have previously alluded. *It is not a constructively relevant criticism of the specific operations of either of those sciences, or in fact of any human endeavor, to remark that they are finite and incapable of anticipating the genuine novelty which natural histories may introduce.*

Still, Niebuhr pursues the difference between these sciences on seemingly independent grounds:

> A *radical* distinction between the natural world and the world of human history must be made, however much history may have a natural base. The justification for this distinction lies in the unique character of human freedom.
>
> Human history must be understood as containing within it the encounters between man and God in which God intervenes to reconstruct the rational concepts of meaning which men and cultures construct under the false assumption that they have a mind which completely transcends the flux of history, when actually it can only construct a realm of meaning from a particular standpoint within the flux. The true God is encountered in (a) *creativities which introduce elements into the historic situation which could not have been anticipated.*[19]

But he very soon subverts the argument:

> These historic revelations can be related *speculatively* to the various aspects of human existence and can make sense out of them. Reason can thus *follow* after faith. It can also *precede* it, in the sense that a highly sophisticated reason can point to the limits of rational coherence in understanding contradictory aspects of reality and particularly to the dimension of the human spirit which cannot be understood without presupposing a dimension of divine freedom above the coherences of nature and mind as its environment; which in its endless self-transcendence knows that all judgments passed upon it by history are subject to a more ultimate judgment. . . .[20]

This excerpt at least is merely a religiously worded equivalent of a sound and comprehensive empiricism. We must not deny the

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 109.
[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 199–200. Italics mine.
[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 201–202. Italics mine.

special problems which religious experience presents. But is there to be found here as well a genuine and fundamental distinction between the natural and the historical order? It would seem not, since the "historic events" which we must accept on "faith" occur in both orders, since human reason may anticipate the incompleteness of all its schemes of order and reconstruct these to incorporate the significance of novel and emergent events. The larger concepts of nature and of history which we had originally formulated would seem adequately to include these facts.

That the "radical distinction" between these two groups of sciences reduces to a matter of degree is in fact the burden of Niebuhr's basic doctrine of "neo-orthodoxy," for he says:

> If we take the discipline of the various sciences seriously, as we do, we must depart at one important point from the biblical picture of life and history. The accumulated evidence of the natural sciences convinces us that the realm of natural causation is *more* closed, and *less* subject to divine intervention, than the biblical world-view assumes. We can be completely biblical in interpreting the drama of human history as an engagement between man and God.
>
> But meanwhile this history *has a base in nature* as man himself has. And the course of nature is *more* subject to inflexible law than the Bible supposes.[21]

This is to say again that the significant historical novelties which appear in the human domain are considerably more complex and numerous than those which appear in the merely physical domain; that therefore social scientists and reformers have to be a good bit more cautious in their generalizations. But there is no basis here for insisting on a "radical distinction" between the two.[22]

There is one additional argument which Niebuhr presents to support the "radical distinction" between the natural and historical sciences. It is a familiar and popular argument, but it is so revealingly worded that it draws immediate attention to its own inadequacy:

> The scientific observer of the realm of nature is in a sense naturally and *inevitably* disinterested. At least, nothing in the natural scene can arouse his bias. Furthermore, he stands completely outside of the natural so that his mind, *whatever his limitations*, approximates pure mind. The observer of the realm of history cannot be disinterested in the same way, for two reasons: First, he must look at history from *some locus in history;* secondly, he is to a *certain degree* engaged in its ideological conflicts.[23]

Surely, the natural scientist must also look at his subject "from some locus in history"; nor is it altogether clear in the twentieth

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 197. Italics mine.
[22] Compare *ibid.*, p. 91.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 91. Italics mine.

century that such science is "inevitably" free from "ideological conflicts." On the other hand, to have a "locus in history" is simply a variant expression of human finitude, which we have already discovered to be really irrelevant to the positive discipline of any particular science; and the identification of "ideological conflicts" presupposes a science which, "to a certain degree," is free of such conflicts.

No. We cannot on such foundations as Niebuhr proposes conclude that the natural and historical sciences are radically different. Nevertheless, Niebuhr seems to have drawn attention to certain quite fundamental questions concerning these sciences. It is in fact difficult to imagine what other metaphysical issues of equal depth could be raised against regarding the natural and historical sciences as continuous and capable of employing the same general scientific method. Perhaps there are some, but one may at least share the lurking suspicion that those who argue the thesis of a "radical distinction" may have in mind the "ultimate" dangers of human pride.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Age of Analysis; Twentieth Century Philosophers. Selected, with Introduction and Interpretive Commentary, by MORTON WHITE. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1955. ix, 253 pp. (The Great Ages of Western Philosophy, VI.) $3.00.

The Age of Analysis is the second volume to appear in a series of six volumes which bears the general title of "The Great Ages of Western Philosophy." Each volume includes a general introduction and a connected commentary by its editor, together with brief selections from representative philosophers of the period. The series as a whole is clearly intended not so much for the academic philosopher and his pupils, as for that wider reading public which has since the eighteenth century been increasingly lost to philosophy. The "great age" of philosophy which is exposed to view in the present volume is our own age, the twentieth century, which Professor White has chosen to label, "by seizing one of its more powerful tendencies" (p. ix), as *The Age of Analysis.*

No one will doubt that an attempt to provide a fair sampling of twentieth-century philosophy in a brief compass is a formidable undertaking, and that the task of providing a synoptic appraisal of twentieth-century philosophy is more difficult still. Professor

White has, I think, done both remarkably well. His principle of organization is expressed by Isaiah Berlin's distinction (taken from the Greek poet Archilochus) between the hedgehog and the fox, between, that is, those "philosophers who strive to know one big thing and those who are content to know little things, or indeed *one* little thing" (p. 18). And so, after selections from Moore and Croce which are intended by Professor White as a sort of paradigm of the different methods and styles of the two kinds of philosophers, the major figures of twentieth-century philosophy pass in orderly review. The "hedgehogs" are Santayana, Bergson, Whitehead, Husserl, and Sartre; the "foxes" are Carnap, Russell, and Wittgenstein; and occupying the middle portion of the book (as, in Professor White's view, they occupy the middle ground of contemporary philosophy) are the American pragmatists, Peirce, James, and Dewey.

Needless to say, Professor White has somewhat modified this over-all schematism with appropriate distinctions and qualifications in his introductions to individual philosophers. Still he returns to it in a suggestive final chapter—all White—entitled "Philosophy and Man: An Exhortation." Here Professor White seems to be directing his words not so much to the general reader, for whom the book was presumably intended, as to his fellow philosophers. The burden of Professor White's exhortation is that "The hedgehog may lie down with the fox, and the result need not be grotesque" (p. 242). Acknowledging that his own philosophical sympathies are closest to the pragmatic and analytic traditions, Professor White yet expresses a sympathy for the *concerns* (italics his) of some of the hedgehogs, and he goes on to urge that "Nothing could be more important than reuniting these two contrasting elements in twentieth century philosophy. . ." (p. 242).

And how may such a *rapprochement* be achieved? Professor White does not, of course, provide any answer to this question, but his brief remarks are suggestive, if somewhat ambiguous. Let us suppose, he writes,

> that all of our knowledge, whether moral, metaphysical, logical, or scientific, is bound into one system, a way of life from which no statement escapes or enters without affecting, however remotely, the status of another. Then what? I suggest that the effort to draw sharp lines between the analytic and the synthetic, the metaphysical and the logical, the descriptive and the normative, will appear silly and futile. . . . Disciplinary labeling will not be a mark of certainty, and indeed, the search for a sharp *criterion* of certainty of necessity will emerge as equally futile. [P. 240, italics in original.]

Here Professor White reveals his concern that philosophy in the twentieth century should again attempt to see things whole,

but it does seem to this reviewer that an attempt to bind all knowledge into a "system" is a very different enterprise from incorporating it into a "way of life." Certainly the relations between the two must be developed at greater length than is allotted Professor White in the brief chapter from which the above quotation was taken. After all, William James, who in the context of his time was attempting the kind of philosophic mediation between the claims of knowledge and the exigencies of life which Professor White now seems to recommend to his fellow philosophers, is characterized by Professor White as "not up to the austerity and forbearance that Peirce's doctrine entailed" (p. 139). What sort of criterion, if not of certainty then of meaningfulness or adequacy in philosophy, is "austere" enough to satisfy Professor White's analytic commitments and at the same time broad enough to include the vital concerns of men? This problem, of course, belongs not to Professor White alone, but to all philosophers for whom philosophy is more than logic chopping or an immediate emotional response to the cosmos.

In summary, *The Age of Analysis* is a skilfully edited volume for the general reader. Its concurrent publication in a paper back (Mentor) edition will undoubtedly enable it to find the wide audience it deserves.

I note one minor error in the text. White states (p. 117) that Sartre's major work, *Being and Nothingness,* is subtitled "An Essay in Phenomenological Psychology." Actually this work of Sartre's bears the subtitle "An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology" (*Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique*).

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Science and Man's Hope. JAMES STREET FULTON. New York: Published by Bookman Associates for the Rice Institute [1954]. 179 pp. $3.25.

Most authors of books and articles dealing with the impact of science upon human society begin by viewing with alarm the frightful potentialities for destruction which science has made possible and, after arguing that it is not within the province of science to tell good from evil, end with little more than moral admonitions to employ science in the interest of human welfare and survival. Professor Fulton makes a more careful analysis than most, but his argument follows the usual pattern.

We need not choose, he tells us, between the view that all that is needed to clarify our goals is more scientific intelligence, and some form of irrationalism. "Scientism" mistakenly supposes

"good" and "evil" to be factual concepts, thereby confusing fact with value. On the other hand, religious mysticism in its appeal beyond reason to faith, "requires a spiritual re-creation which we can only passionately desire but can neither will nor deserve nor understand" (p. 24). The logical analysts are likewise irrationalists in regard to morals by their rejection of all objective evaluation as nonsense.

Dr. Fulton rejects all of these views in favor of what he terms a qualified rationalism. It is within the province of philosophy to make critical evaluations of the facts, including preferences. He argues that the scientist's norm that he should seek the truth and correct error is not itself a factual conclusion of science, and that therefore those who hold that science needs no moral or philosophic wisdom to justify its activities land in a self-refuting paradox. "Scientism must, yet cannot, derive from facts both the verification of its science and the justification of its verifications" (p. 98). Perhaps the paradox is of Professor Fulton's own making. He is right in criticizing the sort of scientism which supposes either that good is only "a name for the basic principles of the scientific philosophy of nature" (p. 102), or that anything whose existence is scientifically verified is good; but he seems to suggest unfairly that any logical empiricist is committed to the assumption that when science is "good" in the definitional sense of permitting dependable prediction, then it also claims to meet some norm of moral goodness. One can define "good" science and yet attach no value to it or even prefer a world in which "good" scientific knowledge (e.g., of atomic fission) had never arisen. To be sure, it would be difficult to find a scientist who does not value the discovery of scientific truths, but the existence of objective criteria for such truths does not imply that these truths have objective value. Being valued is an extraneous fact.

This still leaves it an open question whether, or in what sense, it is meaningful to say not only that some persons *do* value knowledge but that everyone *ought* to value knowledge of scientific truth or *ought* to value one state of affairs and not another. Here the problem is set up in accordance with the familiar philosophical tradition: there are objective value norms (the obligation to seek the truth being one of them) which require philosophical credentials and about which science has nothing to say.

How, then, does Professor Fulton's philosophy provide value norms? Looking for the answer in the last three chapters we find inspirational writing rather than convincing reasons. Aliveness—not mere biological survival, but living well—is "the mode in which goodness enters existence. In a word, life is the actuality

of value; value, the essence of life" (p. 111). "This is the promise of science, that man may through it achieve openness, awareness, and be fulfilled" (p. 118). But scientific knowledge of objects has value only in relation to the purposes of the scientist as subject. Professor Fulton, however, will not allow the scientist to justify his labors merely on the ground that he is interested in the truth, or on the instrumental ground that reliable knowledge is useful in achieving other purposes. Science becomes one of the forms of goodness when the scientist finds his own aliveness, perfection, and fulfillment in understanding truths which have the *right* to be respected, whether or not they please him, or are useful to him; the right to be affirmed even if their denial would save him from imprisonment.

Many readers will share Professor Fulton's sentiments and perhaps agree that "man's hope is that reality will support the promise of his passion for openness" (p. 156), but they will have difficulty finding in this book reasons for holding that they *ought* to.

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